LRA – Conflict Background

Why this war is being fought and what can be done to end it

For over two decades the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group has terrorized communities in northern Uganda and across central Africa, abducting as many as 66,000 children along the way. But behind the brutality of LRA leader Joseph Kony and his top commanders lies a deeper story – a history of division and discord in Uganda that gave rise to their rebellion and that still casts a storm cloud over the country’s future. Though the conflict has now outlasted four US Presidents, President Obama and Congressional leaders now have a unique window of opportunity to help put a stop to the LRA’s atrocities and put northern Uganda on track towards lasting peace.

Roots of the conflict: The conflict in northern Uganda has deep roots, tracing back to British colonial policies of divide-and-rule that exacerbated ethnic tensions and set the stage for a series of post-independence dictators, including the infamous Idi Amin, who ruled the country by fear and iron fist.

The war’s most recent roots date to 1986, when a band of rebels from southern Uganda led by Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s current president, took control of the government. Human rights abuses committed by Museveni’s army sparked a succession of northern rebellions, the most enduring of which has been that of the LRA, led by former altar boy Joseph Kony. However, the rebel group has long since lost popular support in the north, instead terrorizing the very people it claimed to represent and relying on abducted children to sustain itself.

The Ugandan government’s response to the LRA’s atrocities was equally disastrous for northern Ugandans. In the 1990s the Ugandan government forced most of northern Uganda’s population into crowded, squalid displacement camps where as many as 1,000 people died each week. The Ugandan military regularly committed sexual abuse and other crimes against northerners, while failing to protect them from frequent LRA attacks.

In 2005 the conflict took a dramatic turn, as the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and top LRA commanders on charges including war crimes, and the rebels began pulling out of Uganda and establishing bases in the DR Congo. The next year the Ugandan government and LRA began peace talks, which culminated in a final agreement in April 2008. However, the peace process had failed to gain the buy-in of LRA leader Joseph Kony, who refused to sign the agreement and began consolidating his forces in the DR Congo.

A return to war: Despite continued efforts to convince Kony to sign the agreement, the LRA leader ordered his army to begin preparing for a new round of violence. In September 2008 he unleashed his fighters on communities in northeastern Congo, abducting hundreds of children and taking control of an area the size of Connecticut.

In December 2008 a Ugandan-led military offensive against the LRA’s Congolese bases caused a dramatic escalation of violence. The poorly planned offensive failed to surprise the elusive rebel leaders, who responded by ordering massive reprisal attacks on civilians in vulnerable areas of the DR Congo and Sudan. In the space of a few short months, the LRA killed over 850 innocent people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. In March of 2009, the Ugandan army ended its offensive after failing to capture top LRA commanders, who continue to order attacks against communities in the region.

US role in the conflict: The nature of US involvement in this crisis has changed considerably over the past two decades. Historically, the US has strongly supported President’s Museveni’s government despite it’s abysmal handling of the conflict in northern Uganda, providing it with military, financial and political support. This relationship caused the U.S. to turn a blind eye to the Ugandan government’s criminal neglect of the crisis and failure to credibly attempt to end it, as well as contributing to the U.S.’ own neglect of the situation. After favoring unachievable military “solutions” to ending the war for many years, the U.S. reversed its position in 2007 and sent a diplomat to the region to work in support of the then-ongoing peace talks. Despite this welcomed engagement, the negotiations failed to secure Joseph Kony’s signature on the final peace agreement.

How it ends: Kony’s refusal to sign the peace agreement and his decision to continue committing brutal atrocities throughout the region has made it clear that he remains the biggest immediate obstacle to peace. However, as regional governments and UN forces do not have the capacity to stop LRA attacks, it is essential that the US and the international community support a viable, responsible effort to arrest Kony. Any such operation must target top LRA leaders exclusively, avoid endangering captives within the LRA, and be accompanied by a strategy to protect vulnerable civilians from rebel reprisal attacks. Such pressure may even force Kony to finally take concrete, genuine steps towards a negotiated solution.

However, the arrest of Kony and the disarming of the LRA will not alone bring sustainable peace to northern Uganda. Without significant and steady progress on rebuilding war-affected communities, reconciling Uganda’s regional and ethnic divisions, and creating a more inclusive government, the possibility of renewed violence threatens the country’s future. US financial assistance for reconstruction and political pressure on the Ugandan government to get serious about recovery and reconciliation could prove to be key catalysts for a truly sustainable peace in Uganda.

For more information go to www.howitends.tv